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Strategic Insights: An EU Military Headquarters: A Cure in Search of an Illness?
November 14, 2016 | Dr. John R. Deni
In mid-September, European Union (EU) Commission President Jean Claude Juncker
delivered the Commision's annual State of the Union address. 1 Coming on the heels of the British
vote to leave the EU, the address provided a roadmap for overcoming the challenges brought about
by what Juncker termed an “existential crisis.”
Among the key components of the roadmap were several initiatives related to defense and
security. For example, Juncker noted rather bluntly that Europe could not rely on soft power alone
and that it therefore needed to “toughen up.”
This was music to Washington’s ears, particularly when Juncker went on to argue for Europe
to stop “piggy-backing” on the military might of others (read: Washington). European countries
already appear to be heeding his call. After years of flat budgets and defense austerity, there is a
growing body of evidence that European states have in fact begun to increase defense spending
over the last couple of years.2 Although some European states, such as Poland, have been
increasing defense spending—if only slightly—for many years, evidence now indicates that such
increases are broad-based, if perhaps uneven. For example, recent defense spending increases in
Eastern Europe are greater than what is occurring in Northern or Western Europe. Regardless,
Juncker was right to promote and encourage this emerging trend.
However, Juncker then struck a rather discordant tone when he called for a permanent EU
military headquarters. He argued that without a permanent structure, Europe could not act as
effectively as it might. While Juncker is certainly correct in noting that the EU could be more
effective in how it fulfills its missions, the lack of a permanent military headquarters as a
significant causal variable appears largely unsubstantiated by the available evidence.
Since 2003, the EU has conducted nearly three dozen security and defense-related missions in
Europe, Asia, and Africa, under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP).3 The vast majority of these—21 out of 34—have been civilian missions, which have
focused largely on policing, the rule of law, border management, or political monitoring. Whether
civilian or military, all of these missions have generated lessons learned, including through
scholarly study and analysis, as well as official governmental inquiry. Among the most important
factors4 affecting EU effectiveness in the field were a lack of cohesion and consensus 5 at the
political level, insufficient coordination among a variety of European efforts, 6 and a lack of
appropriate funding,7 civilian experts,8 or relevant military equipment.9
Given these lessons learned, it seems something of a non sequitur to propose a permanent EU
military headquarters—something akin to a cure in search of an illness. In fairness, it is possible
such a headquarters might improve effectiveness of some aspects of EU military missions—for
example,10 by potentially improving the speed with which an EU-led military operation might get
off the ground. However, an EU military headquarters would appear to do little to address the
most significant problems confronting all CSDP missions. No amount of headquarters or

headquarters personnel can overcome political-level disagreements in Brussels or resource
shortfalls among EU member states.
In addition to his call for a permanent CSDP headquarters, Juncker used his State of the Union
address to argue for common military assets. In this era of exquisitely expensive military
platforms, common acquisition programs can be an effective means for a number of smaller
countries to pool assets and acquire needed capabilities both for their own purposes as well as for
collective pursuits. Several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, for instance, have
pooled their resources to acquire C-17 transport aircraft. 11
However, pooling and sharing of resources has been too often viewed as a substitute for
investment in defense capabilities. This is particularly so among the “big four” European NATO
members—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—who together account for roughly
two thirds of all European NATO military spending. These leading military powers of both NATO
and the EU have struggled to maintain sufficient capacity across the range of military capability.
In some instances—such as the UK’s maritime surveillance aircraft—capabilities have in fact been
eliminated.12 In other instances—such as the cap on Germany’s end strength—operational
requirements have outstripped capacity.13 At some point—and, as noted above, it seems European
leaders now realize their militaries have perhaps reached this point—no amount of “efficiencies”
can make up for capabilities and capacities cut too deeply.
Taken to its natural extension, Juncker’s call for common “assets” could lead to a common EU
military. The idea of a “European” military force actually has roots far deeper than Juncker’s
September 2016 address. In the early 1950s, the Pleven Plan for Franco-German reconciliation in
the military and security sphere centered on a proposal for a European army. Although this did not
come to fruition, the Élysée Treaty of 1963 sought to build on this initial step, and ultimately it led
to the establishment of a Franco-German brigade in 1987. Since then, the Franco-German brigade
has been deployed to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Mali.
The Franco-German brigade—as well as the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps headquarters that
also stems from Franco-German cooperation—would seem to prove that a European military could
work. At a minimum, a common EU military might allow the “boutique” militaries of many
smaller European countries to become part of a larger, more effective whole.
In practice though, the challenges of truly operationalizing the military integration of personnel
and units from over two dozen sovereign states are insurmountable, at least at present. Even for
the Franco-German brigade, its constituent French and German units have been subject to caveats
resulting in a strange mix of operational capabilities that have frustrated truly combined military
operations. Although the Eurocorps has arguably seen more operational “success,” this has
occurred largely at the level of headquarters staff. When it comes to committing the lives of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, 28 sovereign EU member states can, and often do, have 28
perspectives on whether and how their combat and supporting units should be utilized.
What is missing that might make a European military work is a true political union—without
it, any effort to create a European military force is likely to flounder on the shoals of political
reality. Members of the EU have indeed pooled sovereignty in several issue areas, most famously
in their currencies and monetary policy. When it comes to defense and security though, member
states still retain a great deal of sovereignty.
Instead of real, combined military capability that a true political union might bring, what is
likely to result from premature efforts to build a European military will not be too far removed
from what we see today in some cases. That is, EU battlegroups that rarely, if ever, deploy; and a
NATO Response Force that sees action only in the wake of natural disasters.

European integration in defense and security makes great sense on a variety of levels and from
many perspectives. However, it is naïve, and probably dangerous, to think that an “ever closer
union” in defense and security affairs can precede a political union. As such, Washington would
do well to advise its European allies to pursue reasoned, limited integration, and cooperation when
it comes to defense matters, and as well as to accelerate the emerging trends in defense spending.
ENDNOTES
1. European Commission, “State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe—a Europe that
protects, empowers and defends,” Speech no. 16/3043, Strasbourg, September 14, 2016, available from
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm, accessed on October 26, 2016.
2. John R. Deni, “Still the One? The Role of Europe in American Defense Strategy,” Foreign Policy
Research Institute, available from www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/still-the-one-the-role-of-europe-in-americandefense-strategy/, accessed on October 26, 2016.
3. ISIS Europe, Common Security and Defence Policy Mission Analysis Partnership (CSDP MAP),
“Mission Chart,” October 2014, available from www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart, accessed on October 26, 2016.
4. Michael Emerson and Eva Gross, eds., "Evaluating the EU’s Crisis Missions in the Balkans," Brussels:
Centre
for
European
Policy
Studies,
2007,
available
from
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZiLgI5rOvNcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=lessons+learned+from+EU
+missions+
civilian&ots=mUtQ_iE5DI&sig=7D4ba8EZ0w3tu00tift28or6D0#v=onepage&q=lessons%20learned%20from%20EU%20missions%20civilian&f=false,
accessed
on
October 26, 2016.
5. Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, “Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive
Approach,” Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, Iss. 1-2, 2011, pp. 243-72, available from
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/coning.pdf, accessed on October 26, 2016.
6. Daniel Keohane, “Lessons from EU Peace Operation,” Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol.
15,
Iss.
1-2,
2011,
pp.
200-17,
available
from
booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/187541110x540544, accessed on October 26, 2016.
7 . Kirsten E. Schulze, "Mission Not So Impossible The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons learned
for the EU," Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, International Dialogue
Department, July 2007, available from library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04786.pdf, accessed on October 26, 2016.
8. Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, "Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s
Civilian Capacities," London, UK: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2009, available from
www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR18_-_Can_the_EU_rebuild_failing_States__a_Review_of_Europes_Civilian_Capacities.pdf, accessed on October 26, 2016.
9. Kyriakos Revelas, “The European Union: A Peace Actor in the Making? Reflections Based on the
ESDP Crisis Management Operations in Africa,” Review of European Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 2013,
available from www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/res/article/view/28776, accessed on October 26, 2016.
10. Luis Simón, "Command and control? Planning for EU military operations," European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 81, Condé-sur-Noireau, FR: Corlet Imprimeur, January
2010, available from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Planning_for_EU_military_operations.pdf, accessed on
October 26, 2016.

11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC): A key capability
for
the
Alliance,”
Encyclopedia
of
NATO
Topics,
available
from
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm, accessed on October 26, 2016.
12. “Scrapping RAF Nimrods ‘perverse’ say military chiefs,” BBC News, January 27, 2011, available
from www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-12294766, accessed on October 26, 2016.
13. Ben Knight, “German military gets a personnel boost,” Deutsche Welle (DW), May 10, 2016,
available from www.dw.com/en/german-military-gets-a-personnel-boost/a-19248013, accessed on October 26,
2016.
*****
The views expressed in this Strategic Insights piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the Editor for
Production. All organizations granted this right must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of
the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications may be
downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports may also be obtained free of charge
while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability. SSI publications may
be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

